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The result of the United Kingdom’s referendum on leaving the EU, which was 
held on 23 June 2016, has profound geopolitical, economic, and social impli-
cations for Africa. This is all the more the case given the bilateral UK–Africa 
relationship and interregional Africa–EU relations. 
 • In economic terms, those African countries that rely most on trade with the UK 
– Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Kenya – will suffer in the event of a reces-
sion in the UK. They will also feel the uncertainty that comes with renegotiating 
economic partnerships, which could take years. 
 • A recession in the UK would also call into question the country’s ability to fulfil 
its aid and development commitments. Initial evidence suggests that the new 
government’s focus will be more on strengthening trade relations than helping 
those most in need. 
 • African states will lose an important advocate within the EU, creating a climate 
of uncertainty around economic relations. In the past, the UK has advocated for 
the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, even though it has failed to 
secure substantive changes. 
 • The withdrawal of the UK from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy will 
have implications for the EU’s security practices in Africa. It will affect the finan-
cial contributions to EU-led support for the African Peace and Security archi-
tecture, and thus donors’ ability to maintain much needed support in this area.
 • Brexit challenges the European integration project and the EU’s credibility in 
promoting regional integration. However, it also presents learning opportunities 
for the process and pace of regional integration in Africa. 
Policy Implications
The results of Brexit and its immediate aftermath, particularly the cabinet of 
the new British prime minister Theresa May, are not inspiring for African per-
ceptions of the UK. While the new British government will focus on securing 
short-term economic benefits, African countries will increasingly turn towards 
other funding and trading partners such as China, Brazil, or India. The re-
maining European countries will need to counter Britain’s exit from the Euro-
pean Union by increasing their engagement in trade, development, and secu-
rity policies in Africa.
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Britain Votes Exit – What Comes Next?
The result of the United Kingdom’s referendum on leaving the EU, which was held 
on 23 June 2016, is having and will have profound effects on global and domestic 
political, economic, and social landscapes. Much of the focus in the early days of 
Brexit was on the implications for other EU member states and the UK itself, with 
an emphasis on the economy. However, given the UK’s relationship to Africa, as 
well as existing Africa–EU relations, it is worth reflecting on the broader implica-
tions this seemingly European decision has for its African partners.
The British government’s lack of preparation for a “leave” win became very 
clear through its reaction not only to the referendum result, but also to the implica-
tions for the devolved governments in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The chaos 
that followed the Brexit vote called into question the democratic credibility of Brit-
ish politics, as the whole world, including African states, watched. Furthermore, 
the exit of one of the EU’s larger member states undoubtedly calls into question the 
general idea of regional integration, a project which Africa is invested in for its own 
continent.
The appointment of Theresa May as prime minister represents a new chapter 
for the UK. However, her record as a lawmaker in the areas of social welfare, equal-
ity laws, or public economic and social goods has not inspired confidence. And al-
though the transition from Cameron to May indicates some leadership around the 
process of exiting the EU, the unwillingness of the government to formally invoke 
Article 50 to trigger the UK’s exit has further enhanced the uncertainty. The British 
exit from the European Union will have profound implications for Africa–EU and 
UK–Africa relations in terms of trade, development policy, and the peace and secu-
rity architecture, areas which we reflect upon below.
Implications for Economic Relations in  
Trade and Development
On the economic front, the pound sterling fell significantly against all major curren-
cies including the euro and approximately GBP 200 billion were wiped off the stock 
exchanges in the first week following the referendum alone. It is in the trade and 
development area that we see the greatest implications for Africa.
The EU’s position as Africa’s most important trading partner, and the role the 
UK plays in this trading relationship, means that the Brexit will undoubtedly have 
consequences in Africa. For example, the possibility of a recession in the UK was 
hotly debated before the referendum and has been even more so since the vote to 
exit. The significant fall of the pound sterling after the referendum results were an-
nounced and the economic shock to the stock markets in the days after the vote point 
to this possibility, which is also discussed in a more recent analysis on the topic (see 
Chadha 2016). If a full-blown recession were indeed to take place, it would trigger a 
downturn in international trade and investment, with negative impacts on the EU’s 
and the UK’s African economic partners. It is, however, crucial to state that the  Brexit 
will not affect all African countries in the same way, because the UK accounts for only 
4.3 per cent of Africa’s total exports (Office for National Statistics 2016). 
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In the short to medium term, it is those countries whose economies most rely 
on trade with the UK that will feel the effects of Brexit, while other countries – for 
instance, those from the CFA zone such as Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, or Cameroon – 
will be less affected. As Figure 1 shows, South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt are the 
UK’s most important trading partners on the African continent, with imports to 
the UK from these countries totalling GBP 7.4 billion in 2014 alone. Other African 
countries accounted for GBP 10.5 billion of UK imports in 2014. Another major area 
of economic relations is foreign direct investment (outward FDI): in 2014, the value 
of the UK’s stock of FDI in Africa was GBP 42.5 billion (Office for National Statistics 
2016). The UK is one of the main foreign investors in Kenya (UK Trade & Invest-
ment 2015), with companies such as Safaricom, East African Breweries, or fruit 
and vegetable producers being owned partly by British shareholders. Moreover, be-
tween 1995 and 2014 the UK was South Africa’s seventh-largest export market. [1] 
This fact, together with the recent weakening of the South African rand, means the 
British exit from the EU will have negative indirect consequences for South Africa. 
This will especially be the case if further unfavourable conditions in the UK require 
British companies to reconsider and decrease their investments in Africa.
Despite these possibilities, another scenario might be a situation where Africa be-
comes worse off than it currently is, but the UK actually sees improvement in its 
economic outlook. UK companies currently control large swathes of land in Africa 
containing mineral reserves including gold, copper, platinum, coal, and diamonds 
(Kabemba 2014). While this is seemingly positive, the distribution of this mineral 
wealth in Africa (and the UK) is confined to a very small elite (Curtis 2016). There is 
a gap between how much comes into such countries from the UK via loans, aid, and 
remittances and how much goes out in profit for British shareholders. Companies’ 
potential ability to negotiate independently of perceived EU ethical restrictions in 
future could allow these inequalities to become further entrenched.
1 Source: South Africa 
Data Portal, http://south-
africa.opendataforafrica.
org/uxqhmgf/south-afri 
ca-exports-major-trade-
partners (24 August 2016). 
Other important partners 
include China, the United 
States, Japan, Germany, 
Botswana, and Namibia.
 
Figure 1.  
UK Trade with 
Africa Broken Down 
by Country (GBP bil-
lion), 2004 to 2014
Source: Office for Na-
tional Statistics 2016. 
   4    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 3 | SEPTEMBER 2016 
The Politics of Aid and Development
Just as the UK’s voice in EU trade negotiations will be missed, the loss of its pro-
development voice will represent a blow to Africa’s development aspirations. As one 
of the main contributors to the EU development aid budget, the UK’s departure from 
the EU undoubtedly raises questions as to whether the level of aid given by the EU 
to Africa will be sustained, and whether the current British contribution will actu-
ally be reinvested in aid when its current commitments expire. Unless the definitive 
answer to these two concerns is YES, then African countries will generally lose out. 
A potential change in the level of aid from the EU and the UK would occur for the 
following reasons.
In the period 2008–2013, the UK was the third-largest provider of funding to the 
European Development Fund (EDF), [2] behind Germany and France (Independent 
Commission for Aid Impact 2012). It has thus been one of the most important support-
ers of EU aid programmes in Africa, both politically and financially. This was manifes­
ted in the UK’s advocacy within and outside the EU for rich countries to commit 0.7 per 
cent of their gross national income (GNI) to developing countries in accordance with 
a 1970s UN agreement. In 2015, the UK became the first G7 country to enshrine this 
in law. In addition, it met the commitment by spending approximately 0.72 per cent 
on official development assistance (ODA) in that year (approximately GBP 11 billion).
There is no reason to think the UK’s general commitment to ODA will not con-
tinue following Brexit – it is a cornerstone of the country’s development identity. 
However, the economic losses that the UK has already suffered and will suffer in 
the short to medium term call into question not only its ability to fulfil this commit-
ment, but also the value of 0.7 per cent of GNI in real terms. In times of economic 
uncertainty, politicians play the blame game to shore up political support, and in-
ternational development has always been the scapegoat. We might see a situation 
wherein the legal regulation that commits the UK to 0.7 per cent of GNI is repealed, 
especially given that the new secretary for development, Priti Patel, actively cam-
paigned against this commitment, calling the work of her current department “low 
priority” and for the department to be abolished (The Independent, 14 July 2016). 
Indirect Implications: The UK’s Absence in  
EU Policy Negotiations
While Britain’s exit from the EU will have direct implications for economic rela-
tions as well as development aid, it will also be indirectly felt in negotiations on the 
EU’s foreign policies vis-à-vis African countries. Since Britain’s entry into the Com-
mon Market, the EU’s relationship with the developing world has expanded to in-
clude former British colonies via the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP). Through this relationship, the EU (including its member states) has become 
the largest aid donor in the world. The ACP itself is a sizeable trading bloc and has 
facilitated cooperation among the countries of the developing world. To a certain 
extent, this EU–ACP relationship has allowed all EU member states to benefit from 
preferential access to these markets and to gain leverage in new international trade 
negotiations.
2 The EDF finances  
cooperation with the Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP) and 
Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs) under 
the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement. 
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Because the EU has long negotiated as one bloc with third parties, Brexit means 
all the benefits enjoyed by African countries in terms of preferential access will no 
longer be available vis-à-vis the UK. As Britain leaves the EU, it will have to rene-
gotiate its economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with Africa, a process that can 
take years and that could leave economic relations with the major African econo-
mies such as South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria in uncertainty. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the UK’s departure from the EU will also mean the loss of third-partner 
voices within the EU. For example, while the British government has been a sup-
porter of EPAs, in the negotiations with African countries it has been viewed as an 
advocate for these countries, ensuring that they are compensated in those cases 
where they lose out due to new modes of cooperation. Other European countries 
will now dominate these negotiations. 
Further, the UK has been seen as one of the more influential countries to 
honour the EU’s commitment to ODA. Its exit means that Luxembourg, Sweden, 
and Denmark will lose their most powerful ally in this regard. As British financial 
contributions to EU aid programmes will decrease, so will its influence within the 
EU’s aid package negotiations, especially regarding the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The subsidies for European farmers in the framework of CAP have 
for years been criticised as a competitive advantage that creates an unbalanced 
economic playing field for African farmers. In 2011, then environment secretary 
Caroline Spelman stated, “We’re in a situation where there are global problems with 
food security, economic uncertainty and the loss of biodiversity. Reforming the CAP 
is the best opportunity in a generation to take a major step forward in dealing with 
all of these problems” (cited in The Guardian, 11 October 2011). Although it has not 
actually overseen any changes, the UK has in recent years advocated for the reform 
of the CAP. African countries will now lose their strongest supporting voice in their 
fight for CAP reform. 
Peace and Security Implications
The EU is currently the main contributor to African countries’ security aspira-
tions, primarily through the development of the African Peace and Security Archi-
tecture (APSA) (Haastrup 2013a). Between 2004 and 2014, the EU contributed 
EUR 740 million to the African Peace Facility and has committed the same amount 
for the period 2014–2016. Through this scheme, the UK has been able to contrib-
ute continentally rather than bilaterally to African peace and security. Although the 
opaqueness of peace and security practice means we only know that the UK is the 
third-largest contributor to the African Union’s (AU) African Peace Facility (which 
is funded by the European Development Fund), the UK has been particularly instru-
mental in peace support operations on the continent. The case of the African Union 
Peace Support Operation in Somalia (AMISOM) is especially notable. Within the EU, 
the UK emerged as the most prominent advocate for dedicating funding to AMISOM, 
as part of the broader responses to land and maritime insecurity experienced by So-
malia. In addition to pushing for this financial support, the UK has been a lead part-
ner with the AU in designing the strategy for peace and stability in Somalia. Indeed, 
in a review of the Common Foreign Security Policy, the UK Parliament identified 
Somalia as a key priority of the UK’s work within the EU security architecture. 
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However, when the UK exits the EU, it will have to negotiate separate support 
and engagement agreements. This will result in extra administrative costs for the 
AU. While the current funds are secured until 2020, the funding model will change 
significantly with the British exit from the EU. In places such as Somalia, African 
partners will lose the political leadership of the UK in the context of an EU partner. 
Moreover, unless the UK’s divorce from the EU is entirely amicable, the demand for 
coherence among donors will be further fractured. Also, while the UK has gained 
a measure of legitimacy via the EU in its relationships with African countries, it 
remains to be seen whether this relative cordiality between the UK and many of its 
former colonies will continue bilaterally. 
Brexit has implications for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) missions, the majority of which take place in Africa. In the context of the 
CSDP, the UK has always been a strong advocate for peacebuilding and conflict pre-
vention. This is in contrast to the French approach of a stronger military focus as 
the main peace and security practice. The British exit from the EU implies that the 
British approach to peace and security will be less prevalent within the EU institu-
tions and among EU member states. The withdrawal of the UK might thus translate 
into an identity change for the EU’s security architecture and its security practices 
in Africa, especially if France reasserts its dominance. Although militarism is in-
creasingly being questioned in the current global context – including Africa – as 
a solution to insecurity, the discourse generated by Brexit, which prioritises tradi-
tional understandings of national interest through strong and pre-emptive militar-
ies, also raises important questions about the UK’s approach to security in Africa. 
But above all, the UK’s exit underscores the anxieties regarding the UK’s multilat-
eral relationships – with Europe and the world. 
Impact on Regional Integration Trends
Brexit fundamentally calls into question the EU’s credibility in promoting regional 
integration. In recent years, Africa has intensified its own regional integration pro-
ject. Specifically, it is fair to say that the main policy drivers for the EU’s African 
counterpart, the AU, have been the free movement of goods, the free movement of 
labour, visa-free regimes, and open borders, among others. While the AU itself is 
not modelled on the EU, AU elites have often viewed the EU as a successful version 
of some of its own aspirations. Moreover, the AU itself relies on the EU as its main 
external donor in these endeavours.
In Africa, regional integration is seen as fundamental to increasing intra-Africa 
trade, peace, sustainability, and inclusion, and to decreasing the violent conflicts 
that are so devastating for people and states on the continent. Greater regional in-
tegration will enable the interactions of people from different cultures to fulfil the 
pan-African dreams of kinship and cooperation, while also positioning the coun-
tries of the continent as a bloc within various global governance architectures. If 
Brexit is perceived as a failure in the process of regional integration, then it cer-
tainly problematises the continued consolidation of integration on the continent. 
Yet, regional integration in Africa does not show any signs of deceleration. In 
the weeks since Brexit, the African passport has been announced as the next phase 
in facilitating the free movement of people – even though free movement is one of 
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the main points of contention in the Brexit negotiation process. These diverging dy-
namics fundamentally challenge the dominant scholarship on regional integration 
that sees the EU as a model in Africa (see also Haastrup 2013b). However, Brexit 
may overemphasise some of the short-term costs of integrating while giving voice 
to disgruntled states (Allison 2016). In particular, it will embolden those countries 
already reticent about pooling sovereignty in the medium term and those people 
fighting to retain control over foreign policies. Nevertheless, the fallout of Brexit 
in the UK has, so far, also provided a teaching moment for Africans more generally 
by showing the negative consequences of dissolving a regional alliance (Institute 
for Peace and Security Studies 2016). It has provided an opportunity for African 
politicians and bureaucrats to press for the advantages of regional integration more 
vigorously (see Allison 2016). 
As we have shown, there are certainly lessons to learn, especially on the part of 
Africa, regarding regional integration. However, there are also opportunities. The 
EU enjoys a privileged position in Africa, and through it, the UK has also enjoyed 
one as well. In the wake of Brexit, African governments will continue to consoli-
date their relationships with relatively new partners such as China, Brazil, or India. 
Normatively, this is positive if it fosters effective South–South cooperation. It also 
presents an opportunity for African countries to assert leverage, together or bilater-
ally, when the time comes to negotiate new international agreements with the UK in 
trade, development, or security. And while the UK has benefited from the legitimacy 
of the EU for many years in post-independence Africa, this is the opportunity to face 
up to the past, if the claims of fostering new engagements with the Commonwealth 
are to bear any fruit. 
Undoubtedly, Brexit will have direct and indirect implications for EU–Africa 
relations. Yet, going forward, the aftermath of the referendum represents an op-
portunity for a new strategic orientation of the EU’s economic, development, and 
secur ity engagement in Africa. The remaining member states now have the oppor-
tunity to strengthen the European case with this new strategic orientation while 
extolling and exporting its benefits to Africa without imposition.
Conclusion
The implications of the vote in favour of Brexit extend beyond Europe’s boundaries 
and into Africa. If we take into account the historical context of Africa–EU rela-
tions, Brexit is, on the one hand, a sentimental loss. After all, it was the British entry 
into the European Community that brought about the largest transregional initia-
tive in the world via the EU–ACP relationship, a cornerstone of Africa’s relationship 
with Europe as well as its economic and development agenda. 
On the other hand, and as we have shown above, Brexit will have significant ma-
terial implications too. Although the new British prime minister Theresa May has 
hit the ground running in terms of establishing her new cabinet, her appointments 
are not inspiring for UK–Africa relations, particularly the appointment of Priti 
 Patel, an outspoken critic of the sort of work the UK conducts at the bilateral level 
through the Department for International Development (DfID). The PM’s choice 
and the realities of the UK’s economic landscape further expose Brexit’s potential 
impact on African partners. Moreover, long-term cooperation on peace and security 
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between African countries through the AU, its security architecture, and the EU is 
also uncertain. The president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has recently 
tried to reassure external partners that the EU’s external relations will continue as 
normal. While it would be naïve to assume that the current situation in peace and 
security, development, and trade relations will continue as is given all of the above, 
Brexit also presents important opportunities for Africa, Europe, and the UK. 
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